

UKRAINE AIR WAR MONITOR

Analyses for the Protection of Ukrainian
Cities and Infrastructure

IN THIS ISSUE:

NEW DATABASE: 1,500 SUCCESSFUL
UKRAINIAN AIRSTRIKES ON RUSSIA —
TEN THESES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF UKRAINIAN AIRSTRIKES — UKRAINE
IS RUNNING OUT OF INTERCEPTOR
MISSILES

Data and Analysis:

Marcus Welsch

8 July 2026

VOL XVII

SUMMARY


- ▶ In June, the Russian armed forces continued their air war against **Ukrainian cities and civilian targets** with **5,920 strikes**. Of these, **5,744** were carried out with **long-range drones** — the lowest monthly total since February 2026. A likely reason is that long-range drones are now increasingly being used at the front line, where they are harder to intercept and can cause greater damage.
- ▶ The pattern of **two to four major strike waves per month**, each involving more than 600 drones and more than 50 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles per night, continues.
- ▶ The average **interception rate** in June was 90.1% for drones (May: 91.5%), 79% for cruise missiles (May: 78%), and 41% for ballistic missiles (May: 26%). During the major strikes on Kyiv, interception rates for drones (93–96%) and cruise missiles (95–100%) were significantly higher. Ballistic-missile interception rates, by contrast, fluctuated sharply and fell to 0 % during the attack on 6 July — **pointing to a critical shortage of interceptor missiles**.
- ▶ Pressure on Ukraine's front-line regions remains high. **Kharkiv** in particular is subjected to near-daily strikes. Cities close to the front are increasingly being attacked by **glide bombs**.
- ▶ There is no indication that Russia is scaling back its air war against civilian targets in Ukraine. The US think tank CSIS notes that this would require substantially greater military and economic pressure on the Kremlin. **The United States and Europe have not yet fully exploited the range of measures** available to them, including stricter **sanctions** on the oil sector and secondary sanctions targeting banks in China and Hong Kong.
- ▶ **Ukrainian air strikes** on Russian territory and in the occupied territories not only degrade Russia's military capacity but, through lost oil and fuel revenues, also affect the Kremlin's calculations on the war's sustainability. A **new database project** by the Air War Monitor has analyzed **more than 1,500 successful Ukrainian air strikes on Russia** to assess the impact and dynamics of these strikes and map interconnections among them.
- ▶ Our analysis shows that the success of Ukrainian air strikes rests on three interlocking factors: the **growing range** of the weapon systems used, their continuous technological advancement, and the sustained suppression of Russian air defenses. It is the interplay of these factors that creates **freer corridors** through which **effective deep strikes** can be carried out. These strikes have tangible effects: they degrade Russia's defense industry and oil infrastructure, sever the army's supply lines, disrupt the shadow fleet's operations, and weaken Russia's military position in Crimea.

SITUATION IN JUNE

ANALYSIS AND TRENDS

In June, Russia employed **5,920 long-range attack drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles** against Ukraine — almost a quarter fewer than in May (7,717). This sharp decline stems from the reduced use of long-range drones against civilian targets in Ukraine's rear areas. Overall, Russian forces struck such targets **with 5,744 long-range drones in June** — the lowest figure since February (5,059). The Ukrainian air force suspects that Russia is increasingly deploying Shahed-type long-range drones at the front line, where they are harder to intercept and can cause greater damage ([↗ armyinform, 29.6.2026](#)).

Drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure declined in June by 23% compared to May



Data: Perspectus Analytics, KPSZSU

Fewer **cruise missiles** were also employed (June: 82; annual average: 105). Attacks with **ballistic missiles**, by contrast, **continue to rise slightly** (June: 94; previous month: 92; annual average: 78).

PATTERNS OF RUSSIAN STRIKE WAVES

An analysis of all air attacks since 2025 shows that Russia regularly adjusts the scale and composition of its strike waves and then maintains each attack pattern for one to two quarters. Since autumn 2025, Russian forces have flown **two to four major strike waves per month**, each involving more than 400 drones and more than 30 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles per night.


In June, the **major strike waves** involved more than 600 drones and more than 50 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles within a single night. In addition, over the past six months, Russian forces have typically used missile carrier aircraft — from which air-launched cruise missiles are fired — only about four times per month.

The specific dates of these strikes also cluster around **certain days over the course of the month**: intensive strike waves this year have mostly occurred in the first three days of the month, as well as around the 14th and the 24th/25th. This statistical pattern is not a reliable predictor, but merely an additional indicator that major strike waves — above all

against the capital, Kyiv — are more likely on these nights. Whether and for how long Russia will maintain this rhythm cannot be predicted.

In recent months, Ukrainian drone defenses had continuously improved their **interception rates** — but this trend did not continue in June. The monthly average of intercepted drones declined slightly to **90.1%** (May: 91.5%).

The number of Russian drones that were not intercepted continues to decline; nevertheless, 485 objects were hit (previous month: 458)



Data: Perspectus Analytics, KPSZSU

During particularly intensive attacks involving large numbers of drones, the interception rate remains higher than during less intensive attacks with regionally dispersed targets. During the major strike on 15 June and the most recent strike waves on 2 and 6 July, the drone interception rate stood at between 93% and 96%.

The number of drones that evaded interception fell again in June, to 571 (May: 634) — a trend observed since last autumn. The **accuracy of Russian Shahed/Gerbera-type drones has declined since October**, though

this trend is not linear: in June, the number of objects struck rose again slightly, to 485 (previous month: 458).

THE SHORTAGE OF INTERCEPTOR MISSILES IS WORSENING...

The **cruise-missile interception rate** remained high in June (**79%**, previous month: 78%), while for **ballistic missiles** it rose over the month to **41%** (previous month: 26%). During the major strikes of 15 June and 2 and 6 July, which targeted primarily the capital, the cruise-missile interception rate held steady between 95 and 100%, while the ballistic-missile rate fell from 44% on 15 June to 17% on 2 July and then to **0% on 6 July**, pointing to increasingly depleted stocks of interceptor missiles.

...WITH LETHAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Nights with intensive strike waves are associated with enormous **civilian casualties**. On the night of 2 July alone, 30 people were killed in Kyiv and more than 90 injured (↗ [Kyiv Independent, 2.7.2026](#)). During the major strike on the night of 15 June, at least eleven people were killed across various regions of Ukraine and a further 53 injured (↗ [Office of the President of Ukraine, 15.6.2026](#)). In the attack on the night of 6 July, at least 21 people were killed (↗ [The Guardian, 6.7.2026](#)).

DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE

Alongside deliberate strikes on residential areas, post offices, and other civilian infrastructure, the Russian armed forces have in recent months intensified their **attacks on cultural and religious sites**. The strikes on the

Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex and the Dormition Cathedral in Kyiv drew particular international attention. President Zelensky stated on 28 June that more than **740 religious buildings in Ukraine had been damaged or destroyed** (↗ [Office of the President of Ukraine, 28.6.2026](#)).

ATTACKS ON LOGISTICS, ESPECIALLY IN FRONT-LINE REGIONS

Since spring, Russian forces have also been deliberately targeting **filling stations, fuel depots, and rail infrastructure** in Ukraine to disrupt supply. The regions most affected are Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Chernihiv. Nationwide, **more than 150 filling stations were hit within two months**. So far, however, this has not caused major regional shortages.

What is more concerning is the weapons technology being used: facilities of the state energy company *Naftogaz* in Kharkiv and Poltava were struck within a single week by at least four **ballistic missiles**, some fitted with cluster munitions (↗ [Suspilne 27.6.2026](#)). There have also been reports of a **new Shahed drone variant with a dual warhead**: one of these warheads is said to be packed with **cluster munitions** consisting of around 20 smaller submunitions capable of striking an area with a radius of roughly 80 meters. These munitions are especially dangerous because they detonate only after a delay of two to twenty hours (↗ [ISW, 21.6.2026](#)).


ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN FRONT-LINE REGIONS

Casualties in **front-line regions** of Ukraine remain particularly high, in part because Russian forces deliberately hunt down people in the street to kill them and also use glide

bombs against residential areas (↗ [Monitor Vol. XVI](#)). In glide-bomb strikes on civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia on 20 June, at least five people were killed and twelve more injured (↗ [armyinform, 20.6.2026](#)). According to Ukrainian military analysts, glide-bomb attacks — against which there is still no direct countermeasure — continue to increase. Current estimates suggest Russian forces will be able to deploy more than 75,000 guided glide bombs in 2026, compared with roughly 60,000 the previous year (↗ [FT, 21.6.2026](#)).

In addition, deliberate **double-tap strikes** repeatedly **target rescue workers** (↗ [Monitor Vol. XII](#)). In June, such attacks were often observed in the city of Kharkiv, where a first strike is followed shortly afterward by a second, aimed at medical personnel, firefighters, and relatives of victims. In the **Kharkiv region**, the number of air strikes continued to rise. In June, hits on the city and civilian targets in the surrounding area were reported on 28 of 30 days. Russian strikes in June were concentrated above all on border and front-line regions such as Dnipro, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Odesa. No strikes were reported in Ukraine's western regions in June.

In June, Russia concentrated attacks on border and front-line regions



Data: Perspectus Analytics, diverse data sets

The situation in the air war against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure will only change fundamentally once pressure on Russia increases substantially. A recent analysis by the *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (CSIS) shows that Russia faces growing difficulties recruiting new soldiers and can barely offset its heavy losses (↗ [CSIS, 1.7.2026](#)). This led, in the spring of this year, to Russia's first territorial losses since October 2023 (↗ [Russia Matters, 24.6.2026](#)).

According to the CSIS authors, the West's leverage lies in military support and economic pressure: stricter enforcement of sanctions on Russia's oil revenues and the shadow fleet, and secondary sanctions against banks in China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere. So far, however, neither **the United States nor Europe have fully exploited their available options** (↗ [CSIS, 1.7.2026](#)).

For Ukraine's military counter-strategy, **air strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation and the territories occupied by Russia** are therefore of central importance. They aim to weaken Russian air defenses and arms production. To better understand the impact of these strikes, their dynamics and interdependencies must be analyzed. This is the starting point for the special analysis that follows.

SPOTLIGHT

UKRAINE STRIKES BACK. THE DYNAMICS OF UKRAINIAN AIR STRIKES AGAINST RUSSIA

EXPANDED DATABASE: 1,500 SUCCESSFUL STRIKES ON RUSSIAN TARGETS

Ukrainian strikes on strategic targets in Russia are of central importance for the further course of the war. Successfully hitting **manufacturing facilities, military depots, and logistics supply routes** (*ground lines of communication, GLOCs*) so as to visibly disrupt the flow of weapons, troops, and materiel not only constrains the Russian armed forces' operational capacity. At the same time, it raises the cost of continuing the war and calls into question Russia's ability to sustain it over the long term.

There is also the **impact** of Ukrainian air strikes **on oil and gasoline production**: when revenues collapse, this not only diminishes Russia's military capacity but also alters the broader economic balance that determines the war's continued financing.

A new database project by the Air War Monitor has analyzed **than 1,500 successful Ukrainian air strikes on Russian territory and Russian-occupied territories since 2023**. This figure does not reflect the number of munitions used (drones, missiles, cruise missiles, and initially also manned strikes) — unlike, for example, the interactive map produced by *Novaya Gazeta Europe* (↗ [Dekoder, 2.7.2026](#)). Rather, it documents strikes that can be substantiated

through verified sources, each recorded with location, date, and a qualitative description of the source.

Unlike the Air War Monitor's database on Russian air strikes against Ukraine, which comprehensively covers the period from September 2022 to the present, the new project does not yet claim to be complete. It does, however, already make it possible to trace the dynamics and evolution of Ukrainian air strikes on Russian territory or occupied territories. Combined with OSINT analysis and independent assessments by leading think tanks, this yields a precise picture of **how pressure on Russia can be increased in order to shorten the war**.

OUR TEN THESES ON THE SUCCESS OF UKRAINIAN AIR STRIKES

1. Over time, the **shifting priorities of Ukraine's strike campaigns** become visible: in 2023, targets in the Black Sea and, symbolically, the capital Moscow were struck; in 2024, the focus shifted to Russian air defense systems and ammunition depots, and in 2025 to energy facilities and industrial infrastructure. In the first half of 2026, attacks on supply routes (GLOCs) in the Russian-occupied territories increased sharply.

2. The range of Ukrainian air strikes has also changed over the years — a key condition for their success: initially, strikes concentrated on maritime targets and Crimea; in 2024/25, long-range strikes dominated; in 2026, the emphasis shifted toward mid-range strikes aimed at hitting command posts and weapons depots in the Russia's operational rear in the occupied territories. (Further details on the classification of range categories can be found in the Annex.)

3. This dynamic is made possible by the technological **development of new weapons**: whereas 2023 saw the use mainly of sea drones and Western-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles and ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles, Ukraine scaled up mass production of drones in 2024. In 2025, it developed mature, indigenously produced systems such as Flamingo, FP-2, Neptune, and the Magura sea drone, and today possesses a broad standard arsenal across all ranges (2026).

4. A central element of Ukrainian air strikes — and, at the same time, their most important constant over the years — is the **continuous suppression of Russian air defenses** through targeted attacks on their positions. Only this has allowed Ukrainian forces, from 2025/26 onward, to conduct effective deep strikes

through freer corridors (↗ [Tochnyi study](#), ↗ [Monitor Vol. XV](#)).

5. The strategic focal point of this logic remains the **Crimean peninsula**. As an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” it concentrates Russian air defenses, the Black Sea Fleet, and supply lines in a confined space. In the first half of 2026, transport routes to and across Crimea became an increasingly central focus of Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine's goal was the systematic isolation of the peninsula. Russian workarounds such as pontoon bridges, ferries, and alternative routes were also successfully attacked. While Crimea was never completely cut off from the mainland, supply was reduced to a fraction of what Russian forces need in the field (↗ [Donald Hill, Supplying Crimea, Part 1, 18.6.2026](#)).

6. The Russian defense industry's **production facilities** are being struck with **increasing precision**: after isolated strikes in 2024, Ukrainian forces from 2025 onward began targeting the entire value chain, including production sites for dual-use goods (chemicals, explosive precursors), as well as increasingly the infrastructure underpinning Russia's air war (launch ramps, arms factories).

7. **Attacks on oil infrastructure** evolved from a marginal issue (2023) through a first major wave (2024) into a priority of Ukrainian air strikes (2025), and remain one of the main target categories in 2026. This now affects not only refineries but also pipelines, pumping stations, and export terminals — hitting Russia's oil revenues and the population's general supply situation hard. Ukraine's drones now also reach distant key facilities of Russia's oil infrastructure, most recently striking refineries in Omsk and Saratov, some 2,500 km behind the front (↗ [Euronews, 6.7.2026](#), ↗ [euromaidanpress, 8.7.2026](#)).


8. **Attacks on the Russian shadow fleet** can be understood as “kinetic sanctions” — a complement to conventional sanctions that are not being consistently enforced. In December 2025, strikes on the shadow fleet led to a **300% increase in war-risk insurance premiums in the Black Sea**, while oil exports from the region fell by 30%. This “asymmetric” risk calculus favors Ukraine, since Russia's exposure to damage is substantially higher (↗ [RUSI, 29.1.2026](#)).

9. Since early 2026, **mid-range strikes** have increased sharply. By deliberately cutting Russian supply routes (GLOCs) in the rear, they severely disrupt supply to the front. In recent


months, attacks on transport vehicles, bridges, and airfields, as well as on transformer substations in the Russian-occupied territories, have risen especially sharply.

10. The **latest developments in June** show that the **operational isolation of Crimea**, alongside targeted deep strikes against the Russian oil industry, is becoming a priority of Ukrainian attacks. Pressure on Russian air defense is rising: Russia must increasingly deploy modern, high-value interceptor systems against a large number of Ukrainian strikes, while at the same time, indications of declining S-300 stockpiles point to growing conflicts over the allocation of scarce remaining stocks (↗ [CBS, 17.6.2026](#)).

Ukrainian deep strikes against Crimea and Russian territory surge from mid-2025



Ukraine carried out as many air strikes against Crimea and Russian territory in the first half of 2026 as throughout the entire previous year*



*If an attack was directed at multiple targets, it was included in all applicable categories.

CHRONOLOGY OF UKRAINIAN AIR STRIKES

2023 – “Sea & Symbol” (proof of concept).

The focus is on the Black Sea Fleet, Crimea, and the Kerch Bridge complex: naval drones (USVs) against Russian ships, air strikes on Crimean airfields, and Russian air defenses. Symbolic strikes on the capital, Moscow, function less as operationally significant attacks than as part of strategic communication. With the start of Ukraine's counteroffensive and the arrival of Western long-range weapons, strikes increase massively in spring 2023 — above all through Storm Shadow cruise missiles from May 2023 onward, which hit high-value targets far behind the front (↗ [IISS, 16.5.2023](#)).

2024 – “Air & Arsenals” (attrition of Russian air power). The focus shifts to air defense systems and aircraft. At the same time, refineries and oil infrastructure, as well as major ammunition depots, are struck on a larger scale for the first time, as in September at Toropets (Tver region). Long-range strikes clearly predominate in 2024. The range leap to Tatarstan (Alabuga in April, roughly 1,200 km behind the front) shows that even Russia's core territory offers no absolute protection. Western deliveries of ATACMS missiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles (from 2023) — the latter used for the first time in November 2024 against targets on Russian state territory — increasingly expand the possibilities of *deep precision strikes* (DPS). Russia's strategic advantage in air superiority increasingly erodes as a result of these strikes against high-value targets deep inside the Russian Federation.

2025 – “Economy & Industry” (strategic economic warfare). The focus increasingly shifts to energy and industrial infrastructure and to Russian production sites. The number of energy facilities hit rises sharply from August

and **triples** compared with the previous year. Sustained attacks on refineries, pumping and compressor stations, pipelines, and export terminals (Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Tuapse, Novorossiysk) cause noticeable fuel shortages. A second focus is production sites for microelectronics, explosives and propellant powder, drones, and fiber optics. Two structural breaks mark the year: after missile strikes declined in March 2025 following cuts to US military aid, Ukrainian long-range drones compensate for the shortfall; at the same time, drone technology shifts from simple mass production to more sophisticated uncrewed systems (↗ [KSE, 11.2025](#)). The number of **long-range strikes doubles** compared with the previous year, driven above all by Ukraine's own production of such weapons. A new dimension of Ukrainian strikes deep in Russia's rear was marked on 1 June by Operation “Spiderweb”. For this operation, Ukraine's domestic intelligence service (SBU) smuggled 117 FPV drones concealed in trucks deep into Russia and simultaneously struck four military airfields — from Belaya in Siberia to Dyagilevo near Moscow — hitting, according to Ukrainian sources, around 40 strategic bombers (Tu-95, Tu-22M3) and one A-50 airborne early-warning aircraft. Crimea remains the most frequently struck region in 2025. Attacks on shadow-fleet vessels also increase sharply between July 2025 and January 2026— a renewed rise is emerging in early July 2026.


2026 – “Front & Logistics” (from strikes on supply routes to battlefield interdiction).

The focus of Ukrainian strikes increasingly shifts to the supply routes of Russian forces in Russia and in the occupied territories. The most frequent targets are ground troops, command posts, and staff facilities, as well as logistics and bridges. The occupied territories in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and parts of Kherson region are hit most often. Crimea

records the highest number of hits of the entire war in June 2026. At the same time, air defense systems, oil infrastructure, and logistics (GLOCs), as well as dual-use production sites such as chemical plants, continue to be attacked. Drones carry out the majority of the strikes. Ukraine now has an arsenal of strike weapons spanning all ranges. The profile of the attacks is broader than in 2025: strategic depth is maintained, but the focus lies on hampering operations on the battlefield itself — that is, supply, command, and troops.

This development follows a clear military logic of interdiction: even delaying supplies reduces the adversary's operational capacity; more effective still is the complete cutoff of deliveries, and most effective of all is the destruction of the transported goods themselves. Ukrainian strikes therefore increasingly aim not merely to disrupt Russian supply routes, but to exploit the vulnerabilities created by detours and relocations. Detours — and the resulting longer transport times and bottlenecks — increase the time vehicles and materiel spend within range of Ukrainian drones, creating additional strike opportunities.

At the same time, this approach produces a cumulative effect. Russian countermeasures — such as deploying additional air defense systems, building pontoon bridges, or reinforcing the protection of logistics hubs with infantry — tie down further personnel and materiel. This in turn creates new, identifiable targets whose protection requires additional resources. Operational interdiction therefore acts not only directly against the supply chain but also increases the resource burden of maintaining and defending it. (↗ [Donald Hill, Supplying Crimea, Part 2, 18.6.2026](#)).



Map of Ukrainian attacks on Russian bridges on occupied Crimea, illustration: ↗ [UNITED24 Media](#), 15.6.2026

POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR WESTERN PARTNERS: STEP UP SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPING DEEP-STRIKE CAPABILITIES

The analysis of *deep (precision) strikes (DPS)* shows that Russia remains vulnerable even when it relocates its production sites and logistics deep into its rear areas. But range alone is not decisive. **Payload**, guidance, and speed are also critical to the success, accuracy, and effectiveness of Ukraine's DPS-campaign. If Ukraine is to make this strategic pressure more effective, **support for the further development of propulsion systems and navigation** is one of the most important tasks for Western partner countries (↗ [Monitor Vol. XI](#)).

The analyses of Ukrainian air strikes will continue in forthcoming issues of the Monitor.

Ukrainian Strikes on Targets in Russia, 2023-2026 (Selection)



Data: Perspectus Analytics

ANNEX

CATEGORIES AND RANGES

The database is sorted by geography (Russia, Crimea, occupied territories) and range class. This weighting is reflected in the database as follows:

Long-range strikes refer primarily to strategic strikes on Russian state territory (roughly 600 hits in the database).

Mid-range strikes refer to a range of 30 to typically 150 km (maximum 300 km). These strikes target mainly military logistics in the occupied territories and are also referred to by some institutes as **intermediate-range strikes**, to emphasize the operational campaign category. Likewise, the term **middle strike** underscores the operationally functional meaning rather than the range itself. This category gains massively in importance in 2026 (roughly 500 hits in our database).

Short-range strikes (up to roughly 30 km) hit the front or border area directly — for 2026, an additional 200 cases were recorded here to also capture overlapping effects, i.e. hits on troop concentrations, drone control stations, and depots.

In addition, 250 separately recorded **hits in Crimea** can, depending on the analytical focus, be classified as either *long-* or *mid-range strikes*. In other database projects and analyses, too, these categories are defined with varying degrees of precision — methodologically driven overlaps cannot be entirely avoided.

ABOUT THE MONITOR

The monthly newsletter „**Ukraine Air War Monitor—Analyses for the Protection of Ukrainian Cities and Infrastructure**“ provides analyses on ongoing Russian air strike campaigns, identifies emerging trends, and enables assessments of Russia’s evolving military strategy and capabilities.

The Monitor is based on a database of all Russian air strikes on cities and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and currently records over 112,100 attacks since September 2022.

The **Ukraine Air War Monitor** is published by Kyiv Dialogue in cooperation with OSINT and data analyst Marcus Welsch and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

The current issue, as well as further information about the series and methodology, can be found on our website (↗ kyiv-dialogue.org).

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Marcus Welsch is an independent analyst, documentary filmmaker, and publicist.

Since 2014, he has focused in particular on the Russian war against Ukraine, military and foreign policy issues, and the German public discourse surrounding them. He runs the data and analysis platform ↗ [Perspectus Analytics](https://perspectus-analytics.com).

ABOUT KYIV DIALOGUE

Kyiv Dialogue is a civil society platform founded in 2005 to promote German-Ukrainian cooperation, and an international conference format.

Since February 2022, its work focuses on military support for Ukraine and Western sanctions policy.

Kyiv Dialogue is a program of the European Exchange gGmbH.

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IMPRINT

Publisher:

European Exchange
gGmbH
Erkelenzdammm 59
D-10999 Berlin

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
e. V.
Klingelhöferstraße 23
D-10785 Berlin

Represented by:

Stefanie Schiffer
(European Exchange
gGmbH)
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gGmbH)

Dr. Jan-Philipp Wölbern
(Konrad Adenauer
Foundation)

Editing and Design:

Matthias Meier

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